policy and, as he stresses in the last chapter, is endangering containment of Communism today.
He performs a timely service in pointing up the extent to which isolationist pressure has contributed to the hesitancies of U.S. It is my impression that Welles’s book adds relatively few significant facts to the known record. Roosevelt made possible the creation of the United Nations before the war’s end.Ī book of this kind opens up controversies (including Welles’s feud with Hull) which are going to be fiercely debated for years, and which certainly cannot be debated in a paragraph - all I can proffer is a marginal comment or two. That settlement was bound up with Roosevelt’s determination to unify China under Chiang Kaishek, a policy abandoned after his death. The Far Eastern settlement reached at Yalta was “warranted,” in the light of the military leaders’ (erroneous) estimate that we needed Russia’s help against Japan. Secretary of State, and Winston Churchill on grounds of “military expediency.” 6. The grave mistake made in postponing political and territorial settlements until the end of World War II cannot be blamed primarily on Roosevelt this postponement was urged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. This decision “saved New World Unity.” 5. On January 25, 1942, Roosevelt overruled Hull’s instructions to Welles to reject the limited declaration of anti-Axis solidarity which was the most Argentina would accept at the Pan-American Conference at Rio. The late President, who has been accused of “provoking the Japanese attack, was consistently more cautious on the issue of embargoes than most of his military and diplomatic advisers, because of his awareness of isolationist sentiment.
Roosevelt’s policy toward the Vichy government played an important role in hastening victory.
It was scotched by Cordell Hull and Chamberlain. Roosevelt had a statesmanlike plan, to be announced on Armistice Day, 1937, for rallying the peaceful nations against the drift toward war. Marguerite Higgins, in the fullest sense of the phrase, was there. Miss Higgins warns that the new militarism of China has produced a first-class army and that the Korean fighting has proved a crucial point which Americans are reluctant to face: “We can no longer substitute machines for men.” It is “a mockery,” she declares, to suggest that we can stand up to Communism in Europe and Asia with three and a half million soldiers - “Every responsible officer knows that it will be closer to fourteen million if we want to win.” All in all, War in Korea is a book that packs a man-sized punch. As for his decision to cross the 38th parallel, it had no bearing whatsoever on Chinese intervention. MacArthur’s “end the war” offensive, she says, was a blunder which, in view of the Intelligence difficulties, was not as heinous as his critics have charged the General was victimized by the legend of his infallibility. While War in Korea is mainly a combat story, the author makes some forthright comments on the controversial issues.
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